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Article 10

not been medicated into oblivion by pop psychology. Rather; tl· y
had been treated as the symptoms which point to the deeper illnc >,
the spiritual cancer of sin.
Some time ago, I read about a man who had spent his entire · :e
pursuing feats of daring and bravery, and accomplishing the m .:;t
incredible variety of achievements I had ever witnessed. He had b( ·n ·
deep-sea diving to the bottom of the ocean and had climbed 1e
world's highest mountains. He had been borne aloft by hot <ir
balloons, by gliders, and by every description of airplane, helicop1 ·r,
parachute and blimp. He had shot the rapids of the Colorado Rivei in
the Grand Canyon, had been chased by the bulls in the Palermo, Sp in
annual ritual, and on and on. His list of accomplishments was t r ly
amazing. When asked why he had done all these things, he s id
basically that he did not want to get to be an old man and think b· ck
and regret that he had not pursued some of the possibilities which l ad
been open to him. "A life of no regrets"- that'swhat he wanted.
Today, if we wish, we can pursue a life of no regrets. Even m >re
important, we can have a "life of no disabling fear," of "no crippl ng
guilt." This is accomplished not by ignoring fear and guilt, nor ' y
suppressing them, nor by talking ourselves out of these emotions. 1 is
is accomplished as a gift, for those who will receive it- a gift of ife
and salvation from the Father Who loves us, from the Son
ho
redeems us and from the Spirit Who makes us holy. The triune Cod
sets us free to live- today.
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Th~ _u_nprecedent~d progress in recent years in man 's technological
capabilities to modify, reshape, or re-engineer himself evokes a sense
~f ~neasiness and awakens the memory of Eden . Eat of the forbidden
Uit, God warns, and you are surely doomed to die. Eat, promises the
~rpent; you .certainly .will not die, you will be like God. The temptation to be hke God Is at the root of the ethical dilemmas which
~ntemporary .biotechnology poses, particularly that branch of bio~hnology which has the power to alter man in a radical way. Should
~·Ience recreate man; Will homo futurus resemble the superman of the
rietz~chean or S?aVIan dream? Will re-created. man be, as the serpen t
P om1Sed, more hke God? Because such questiOns as these are raised
~·h
Ic surely carry the discussion beyond science and into the domain'
of theology, many social critics perceive a profound antagonism
between certain biotechnological projects and biblical theology. " The
rnost alarming features in the biotechnology revolution ," writes
~uthor Wes Granberg-Michelson, " are not its scientific advances but
Its theological assumptions. " 1
E.t hicist Paul Ramsey has enlarged upon modern biotechnology 's
dubious aspiration to godhood in his book, Fabricated Man. So famil166
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iar are we with "techno-theologians," he contends, that many oi 1s
believe they actually are theologians and that, in their writings, t 1 'Y
are using theological concepts and are doing religious ethics. 2 Th se
techno-theologians, in fact, are the shaman of an age in which c 1c
praise of bioengineering is virtually the only form of prophecy t at
has social respectability.
The late distinguished Roman Catholic theologian, Karl Rahner, in m
article titled "Experiment Man," probes the question of what, if " ·ything, a theologian may say about present schemes for man's in• ~ f
inite self-modification. Rahner argues that man has no alternative ut
to change himself if he wants a world population of billions to surv 1e.
In order to bring about this change, Christians must oppose wha1 he
calls "bourgeois conservatism." "Man," he argues, "is essentiall a
freedom event," a person who is subject to himself and capablE of
freely determining his own final condition. His "self-determination · is
so complete, Rahner continues, "that he can ultimately and absolu· :!ly
become what he wants to be." 3
Rahner's argument can easily be interpreted as offering a c. rte
blanche for unlimited human self-modification, for he states, o )timistically, that "there is really nothing possible for man that he O l ght
not do." 4 Nonetheless, he is still aware of contradictory and desL uctive forms of self-creation man might engineer on a large-scale ' ' at
could have "irreversible, irreparable consequences in the future which
future manipulation will be unable to undo ." Ramsey finds Rahn r's
thinking on this point (and the thinking of Protestant theologians of
secular, historical "hope") to be so vague and lacking in moral guidelines that would safeguard man in his own proper nature, as to obliterate the distinction between being men and being God, or, as he puts
it: "being men before God and being God before we have learned to
be men. "5 Ramsey's watchword is that men ought not to play God
before they learn to be men, and after they have learned to be men,
t.hey will not play God. s
Ramsey is not developing but merely alluding to a distinctio n of
fundamental importance, one which separates two competing theo logical perspectives in which man seeks to become more like God or more
godlike. Since the blurring of these two ethical perspectives is at the
heart of the essential ethical dilemma posed by current biotechnology,
it is important to attempt to distinguish them clearly and to elaborate
upon each in some detail.
The Promethean Perspective
The fundamental assumption of the Promethean perspective is that
man and God (gods) are essentially antagonistic to each other. Man
needs somethirtg to fulfill his destiny - fire, light, knowledge , freedom, courage , and so on -that God withholds. In order for man to
acquire what he needs, he must take it, as Prometheus stole the fire. A
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theology becomes Promethean, then, whenever it assumes that man's
supreme perfection is so.mething God wants to prevent him from
attaining. But in seizing from God what God wants to keep for Himself, the radical distinction between man and God dissolves and man
becomes more "like God. " At the same time, as explained by Promethean philosophers from Feuerbach to Sartre, God ceases to be.
Feuerbach argues in his book, The Essence of Christianity , that
"the distinction between the human and the divine is illusory. " 7 Man,
according to Feuerbach, is radically unfulfilled because he alienates
the best part of himself in the name of an imaginary God. The task of
philosophy, therefore, is to convince men that the God to whom they
attribute qualities of perfection and transcendence is really the alienated better part of themselves they have projected upon a nonexistent
being. Feuerbach simply transfers attributes of God to man and
enjoins men to be like God. " Man with man, the unity of me and you:
this is God! The love between men must be elevated to the rank of
divinity. " s
Marx, who was Promethean by temperament, later adopted Feuerbach's rational formulations of alienation and the illusory nature of
God. In his earlier writings, Marx wrote about Prometheus chained to
his rock and expressing contempt for the gods with lyrical enthusiasm
and admiration. He saw in Prometheus a symbol of man denying the
gods and assuming responsibility for his own creation. "I would much
rather be bound to a rock," he exclaimed, "than be the docile valet of
Zeus the Father!"
We find a similar Promethean strain running through the thought of
Nietzsche and other disciples of the "God is dead" movement. "God is
dead," Nietzsche announces, "now it is our will that Superman shall
live." 9 Emil Bergmann proclaimed in words that anticipated some of
today's techno-theologians ; that "it is possible to breed not only
animals but the man-God." As Henri de Lubac, S.J. has ppinted out in
his study, The Drama of Atheist Humanism, such thinkers trace their
descent from Prometheus, whom they acclaim to be "the first of the
martyrs." 10
In Sartre's Les mouches and in Dostoevsky's character Raskolnikov
of Crime and Punishment, we find important landmarks in modern
literature referring to man 's attempt to rise above himself through his
own heroism and claim the godhead for himself. The Promethean
themes of heroism and taking control are amply presented in modern
thought, and application to the ethics of bioengineering is clearly
· evident.
Ethicist Joseph Fletcher, who is also an ordained Protestant clergyman, is perhaps the most outspoken of today's Promethean technotheologians. "To be men," he expostulates, "we must be in control.
That is the first and last ethical word. " 11 Fletcher regards it as a
sacred duty for modern man to take control of his own heredity _Yet
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he advocates more than that and even welcomes the opportunity ' ' o
bio-engineer or bio-design para-humans of 'modified men. ' "12
The Promethean perspective is not only anti-theistic but aJ ;ihumanistic as well. Man's nature, given its mortality and finitu e,
must be transcended. And since God, or the idea of God , resists i is
transcendence, · God cannot be an object of hope. Thus, man m st
attempt the heroic (perhaps the impossible) and try to become ( Jd
himself, a man-God or a self-created being who is like God.
Gerald Feinberg, a physicist at Columbia University, is the aut or
of The Prometheus Project. In this work, Feinberg urges mankinc. to
press on to " transcendent goals" which " require the creation r
achievement of something qualitatively new. " Since man, as Feint ·rg
reasons, despairs at the recognition of his own finitude - a recogni~ on
which prevents him from achieving abiding contentment - we n tst
inaugurate "a transformation of man into something very diffe ·nt
from what he is now called for . ... "13
It should be clear that projects such as those proposed by Flet c er,
Feinberg, and others, are rooted in a despair over man as he is . ' his
despair is the natural and inevitable reaction to the human condi on
which is mortal and finite and the awareness that man can find nei ner
satisfaction nor hope in his limited and fallible human nature. •'he
Promethean call invit es man to attempt a quantum leap beyond r ere
humanness into the realm of the gods. Such a call summons hE oic
courage. But in the end, after rejecting both God and human na1,tre,
man is left with no place to find rest, no place to stand. At the s.1me
time, in the spirit exemplified by Malraux and Camus, it may. be hat
the struggle itself is enough to satisfy the mind and heart of t he
Promethean figure. Yet the techno-t heologians have more ambitious
hopes.
Humanistic psychoanalyst Erich Fromm , in The Sane . S oc1ety,
remarks that life is so burdensome that it is truly surprising more
people are not insane.14 A few years lat er, he wrote a book enttt led
You Shall Be As Gods, affirming the promise of the serpent_15 We are
left to wonder how Fromm can place any credence in such a quan tum
leap, or whether he envisages a race of gods verging on insanity .
The Biblical Perspective
At the heart of the biblical perspective is the conviction that man
and God are friends . In fact , this friendship (or sonship with God ) is
such t hat it constitutes a world of grace. To put it another way , grace
is testimony to the harmonious continuity between God and manAccordingly, nature is the soil of grace and through nature, man is
able to return to God. Grace means that there is no opposition
between man and God, and that man is able to be sufficiently united
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withi~ him~el~ \not alienated) to live without opposition to God. If
there Is an mfi~I~e abyss which separates God from man , there can be
. no ~ace _and _fimte man is thus left to his own natural resources to
achieve his ultimate perfection.
t _God in no way is resentful of man 's innermost natural needs. Everyohmg that God creates is good (" There are no dustbins in the house of
the L~,rd," as G. K. Ches~erton says). He " hates nothing that He has
made. He does not obhge man either to save his soul by a Promethean tour de force, or come crawling toward Him on his stomach
God_ .~reates_ man_ in such a way that He makes it possible for man t~
part~cipate m His own divine life, that is to say, to become more
go~hke. Because the World of human nature and the world of God are
umted by grace, man, by becoming more godlike, not only fulfills his
human natu~e ~u.t also ~urpasses it, satisfying his deeper longings for the
eternal and mfimte which mere nature itself cannot fulfill 16
The philosophical-theological vision of Thomas Aqui~as is in perfect accord with this notion of the harmony and continuity between
nat_ure and God. Etienne Gilson, the well-known Thomist and histonan of philosophy, has remarked that " The central intuition which
governs t?e who~e ~h~losop~ical and theological undertaking of Saint
!h~mas IS that It IS Impossible to do justice to God without doing
JUstice to nature, and that doing justice to nature is at the same time
the surest way of doing justice to God." 17
In the Promethean perspective, the assumption is made that man
. comes into p~ssession and entitlement of what he needs through conquest. Acco~dmg to the biblical perspective, God offers man what he
needs as a gift that needs only to be accepted. Here, salvation belongs
to the order of love and acceptance, rather than to the order of
resentment a~d conquest. Man becomes more godlike as he freely
~cepts the gift of God which exists within his own soul. Something
longs to man, then, not because he has taken it through power but
because he has received it through love.
'
G~?es~s 1:26 re~ds: "Let us make mankind in our image and likeness. First, man IS created in God's image. This "image" is in the
~ructu:; of man's soul, whether he is aware of it or not. But this
e I~age be~omes ~ . "likeness" of God when the intelligence is
~lightened m a spmtual understanding of God and when the will
raiSe~ the _whole soul in love for God. The "likeness" of God (being
g?dhke) IS the perfection, through knowledge and love of God's
. ~~mage" in man. According to St. Augustine, "In this im~e (which is
e s?ul) the resemblance of God will be perfect when the vision of
G~d Is perfect." 18 Aquinas adds that likeness which is a kind of
llnity, "signifi~s a cert~in perfection of image." 1~ It is not enough for
rnan to recognize the "Image" of God within himself which makes him
:tentially godlike. He must actualize this potential through knowlge and love.
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In the Promethean approach, man raises himself up by his
,1
powers. This represents merely an intensification of powers that e
already present in human nature. According to the biblical persr >
tive, on the other hand, man is raised up by supernatural gifts >r
which his nature has a passive and obediential potency.
The Promethean approach is intensely humanistic in that it c ls .
man to realize his full potential as a human. Nonetheless, it is a ihumanistic in that it demands that man go beyond his human natt e,
recreating himself according to a pattern which is not human. Bee~ se
the Promethean approach requires extraordinary courage and her01 n,
its fundamental appeal is to the individual. Indeed, for the Pro · ethean individual, everything converges upon the self. According to
biblical theology, however, the self is fulfilled by selfless love for o1 er
persons. The notion of biogenetic perfection which is d~scus~ed am ng
techno-theologians is one which devolves upon man m h1s matf' ial
individuality alone, for such spiritual realities as fe~lowship i~
Jd,
love of others, and faithfulness to God are not subjects for b10t r ~h
nical operations. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge he
courage the biblical perspective demands. Whereas Promet •an
courage is needed for the individual to stand alone and accept is
struggle the biblical approach demands a sterner and yet more hun le
courage' to accept the human condition with all its painful fin it .tde
and to accept the reality that we cannot be like _G od . H~re the
virtues of humility and faith complement courage and protect 1_t fr m
degenerating into fanaticism. The Promethean seems p~e-emm~n tly
heroic only because all of his strength is concentrated mto a sm gle
virtue- courage. Realistically, however, he is prone to a host of
disabling vices, including intemperance, pride, and arrogance.
Thomas Merton offers a summary distinction between the Promethean and biblical (Christian) perspectives in describing The N ew
Man who emerges as more godlike, rather than more like God:
The union of the Christian with God is the exact opposite o f ~ Pro me·
thean exploit, because the Christian is not trying to steal somet~mg :ro m
God that God does not want him to have. On the contrary , he IS stnvm g
·th his whole heart to fulfill the will of God and lay hands upon th a t
·:~ich God created him to receive. And w_hat is that? It is nothin~ else b~~ a
participation in the life, and wisdom, and JOY and peace of God Himsel f.

Biotechnology in Perspective
The radical limitations of the Promethean perspec~ive are ~an_Y. We
draw attention only to four . The first represents a VIrtual rejectiOn of
religion, at least traditional_bib~ical_religion. The Promethean _per~~ec~
tive does not justify this re]ect10n; 1~ ~er~ly assumes that no JU~tlf~ca
tion is necessary. But in rejecting rehg10n, 1t accepts ~xcommu~ucat10n
from a possibly real and loving God Who confers VItal benef1ts upon
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His creatures. It also disavows the type of ultimate meaning that only
a religious framework can provide. Andre Malraux, whose life dramatically illustrates the Promethean attitude, writes in The Human Condition that it takes 60 years of incredible suffering and effort to make a
unique individual, and then he is good only for dying. The Promethean attitude, which begins in despair, must also end in despair.
Marx's defiant revolutionary phrase, "I am nothing and should be
everything," is a perfect articulation of this despair.
Secondly, the Promethean perspective focuses narrowly on man as a
material individual and fails to embrace his whole nature as a being
who is spiritual as well as material, free as well as determined. It also
neglects the importance of moral values which are simply not
amenable to biotechnological control, but spring from the heart of
man. Kindness and generosity of spirit are at least as important for a
better world as a perfectly designed genotype. Biochemist Leon Kass
makes a point that is more difficult to refute than to ignore when he
writes:
It is probabl y as indisputabl e as it is ignored that the world suffers more
from the morally and spiritually defec t ive than fr om t he geneticall y d efective. Thus, it is sad that our best minds are busy fighting our genetic short·
comings wfttl.e..our more serious vices are allowed to multipl y unmolested. 21

In addition, the Promethean approach is incapable in principle of
overcoming the more radical weakness of the human being - his mortality and finitude - including the unannullable facts that he is not
God, not his own creator, and not the object of his own beatitude.
Ernest Becker concludes his Pulitzer Prize winning work, The Denial
of Death, by asserting that "a project as grand as the scientificmythical construction of victory over human limitation is not something that can be programmed by science. " 22 Concerning the ineradicable limitations that the Promethean spirit is wont to deny, he
Writes: "There is no strength that can overcome guilt unless it be the
strength of God; and there is no way to overcome creature anxiety
unless one is a god and not a creature. " 23
The fourth limitation is perhaps the most significant and has to do
with the fact that the Promethean perspective, rooted as it is in
despair over the human condition, is essentially anti-humanistic. Thus,
it is a perspective which is not so much interested in serving the needs
of human nature, as in· responding to needs which transcend human
nature. An exaggerated interest in what Paul Ramsey calls " question~ble aspirations to Godhood " 24 can easily displace a normal interest
Ill the human role of medicine and science as a human enterprise
Which serves human beings. Human nature, limited as it is, is a good .
Moreover, the immediate and common universal needs of man which
biotechnology can remedy are health needs.
The vast array of health remedies which biotechnology possesses
and promises -- from gene therapy to the regeneration of organs May, 1984
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provides a great service as well as a great hope for mankind. Perl ps
the greatest danger to biotechnology's realizing its great potent i is
the abiding belief that biotechnology has a more important func )n
to play in re-creating man.
The biblical perspective does not see the world 's humanizatic as
first dependent on technical progress.25 At the same time, this er·
spective demands the full employment of biotechnology in the i1 er·
est of restoring man to health. Because human nature is regarde s a
good created by God and, through grace, harmoniously united ith
Him, biotechnology serves a vital function in coming to its aid . l\ ed·
ical technology is good only because human health is good.
At the close of their book, Who Should Play God ? authors Hov trd
and Rifkin express the fear that biotechnology will be applied on·
trary to the good of human nature. "The very knowledge that w .:an
now be replaced," they write, "should provide a stimulus for t' to
prove that we are worthy of being preserved. ;' 26 Yet how d we
" prove" that human nature is a good worthy of being preserved? E- .1ch
a proof, involving, as it does, a metaphysical valuation, canno t be
made by science. Is not the whole moral force of the biblical pers•Jec·
tive nothing other than conveying the truth that man is good (and
worthy of being preserved) because he is the creation of a God Who
Himself is all good? Paul Ramsey makes the point in these words :
We ought rather to live wi t h charity am id the limits o f a· biological a nd
historical exist ence which God created for the good and simple reason th a t,
for all its corruption , it is now- and for the temporal future will be - the
good realm in which man and his welfare are to be found and served . 27

All men by nature seek God . II:J. practice, they either seek to be God
or to be with God. In either case, they need a transforming force
which allows them to advance toward their ultimate destinies. This
force is either a natural power which exists within man, or a su per·
natural love by which man participates in the life of God. These two
distinct approaches- one Promethean, the other biblical - are
irreconcilable. In the former case, man seeks to be like God
(equivalent to God) ; in the latter, he seeks to be godlike (participating
in the life of God). The current discussion concerning modifying man
through biotechnology includes a theological dimension which stands
to be greatly clarified by distinguishing betewen the Promethean and
biblical perspectives. Paradoxically, it is the latter perspective which
ostensibly is concerned with man 's relationship with God, which is
also concerned with man as a good who is worthy of the kind of
salutary help biotechnology can offer him. The Promethean perspec·
tive, on the other hand , in stressing the importance of man tran·
scending his n,ature through his own effort, presents the twofold
danger of failing in its intent and deflecting interest away from man's
basic health needs which are grounded in his reality as an imperfect and
limited human being.
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